Re-validate security notes server-side for a proposed policy chunk.
(host: &str, port: u16)
| 3219 | |
| 3220 | /// Re-validate security notes server-side for a proposed policy chunk. |
| 3221 | fn generate_security_notes(host: &str, port: u16) -> String { |
| 3222 | let mut notes = Vec::new(); |
| 3223 | |
| 3224 | // Flag destinations that are an internal/private address. Parse the host as |
| 3225 | // an IP literal and defer to the canonical RFC-accurate classifier |
| 3226 | // (openshell-core net::is_internal_ip) rather than naive string prefixes: |
| 3227 | // `starts_with("172.")` wrongly matched 172.0-15 / 172.32-255 (RFC 1918 is |
| 3228 | // only 172.16.0.0/12) and missed CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), IPv6 ULA, etc. The |
| 3229 | // "localhost" hostname is not an IP literal, so it is checked separately. |
| 3230 | // See #1777. |
| 3231 | let resolves_internal = host.parse::<IpAddr>().is_ok_and(is_internal_ip); |
| 3232 | if resolves_internal || host == "localhost" { |
| 3233 | notes.push(format!( |
| 3234 | "Destination '{host}' appears to be an internal/private address." |
| 3235 | )); |
| 3236 | } |
| 3237 | |
| 3238 | if host.contains('*') { |
| 3239 | notes.push(format!( |
| 3240 | "Host '{host}' contains a wildcard — this may match unintended destinations." |
| 3241 | )); |
| 3242 | } |
| 3243 | |
| 3244 | if port > 49152 { |
| 3245 | notes.push(format!( |
| 3246 | "Port {port} is in the ephemeral range — this may be a temporary service." |
| 3247 | )); |
| 3248 | } |
| 3249 | |
| 3250 | const DB_PORTS: [u16; 7] = [5432, 3306, 6379, 27017, 9200, 11211, 5672]; |
| 3251 | if DB_PORTS.contains(&port) { |
| 3252 | notes.push(format!( |
| 3253 | "Port {port} is a well-known database/service port." |
| 3254 | )); |
| 3255 | } |
| 3256 | |
| 3257 | notes.join(" ") |
| 3258 | } |
| 3259 | |
| 3260 | /// Reject proposed rules whose endpoints or `allowed_ips` target |
| 3261 | /// always-blocked addresses (loopback, link-local, unspecified). |
no test coverage detected