Function validatePath

src/utils/permissions/pathValidation.ts:382–494

(
  path: string,
  cwd: string,
  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
  operationType: FileOperationType,
)

 * Returns whether the path is allowed and the resolved path for error messages.
 */
export function validatePath(
  path: string,
  cwd: string,
  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
  operationType: FileOperationType,
): ResolvedPathCheckResult {
  // Remove surrounding quotes if present
  const cleanPath = expandTilde(path.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, ''))

  // SECURITY: Block UNC paths that could leak credentials
  if (containsVulnerableUncPath(cleanPath)) {
    return {
      allowed: false,
      resolvedPath: cleanPath,
      decisionReason: {
        type: 'other',
        reason: 'UNC network paths require manual approval',
      },
    }
  }

  // SECURITY: Reject tilde variants (~user, ~+, ~-, ~N) that expandTilde doesn't handle.
  // expandTilde resolves ~ and ~/ to $HOME, but ~root, ~+, ~- etc. are left as literal
  // text and resolved as relative paths (e.g., /cwd/~root/.ssh/id_rsa).
  // The shell expands these differently (~root → /var/root, ~+ → $PWD, ~- → $OLDPWD),
  // creating a TOCTOU gap: we validate /cwd/~root/... but bash reads /var/root/...
  // This check is safe from false positives because expandTilde already converted
  // ~ and ~/ to absolute paths starting with /, so only unexpanded variants remain.
  if (cleanPath.startsWith('~')) {
    return {
      allowed: false,
      resolvedPath: cleanPath,
      decisionReason: {
        type: 'other',
        reason:
          'Tilde expansion variants (~user, ~+, ~-) in paths require manual approval',
      },
    }
  }

  // SECURITY: Reject paths containing ANY shell expansion syntax ($ or % characters,
  // or paths starting with = which triggers Zsh equals expansion)
  // - $VAR (Unix/Linux environment variables like $HOME, $PWD)
  // - ${VAR} (brace expansion)
  // - $(cmd) (command substitution)
  // - %VAR% (Windows environment variables like %TEMP%, %USERPROFILE%)
  // - Nested combinations like $(echo $HOME)
  // - =cmd (Zsh equals expansion, e.g. =rg expands to /usr/bin/rg)
  // All of these are preserved as literal strings during validation but expanded
  // by the shell during execution, creating a TOCTOU vulnerability
  if (
    cleanPath.includes('$') ||
    cleanPath.includes('%') ||
    cleanPath.startsWith('=')
  ) {
    return {
      allowed: false,
      resolvedPath: cleanPath,