Function check_submodule_url

submodule-config.c:311–363

}

int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
{
	const char *curl_url;

	if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
		return -1;

	if (submodule_url_is_relative(url) || starts_with(url, "git://")) {
		char *decoded;
		const char *next;
		int has_nl;

		/*
		 * This could be appended to an http URL and url-decoded;
		 * check for malicious characters.
		 */
		decoded = url_decode(url);
		has_nl = !!strchr(decoded, '\n');

		free(decoded);
		if (has_nl)
			return -1;

		/*
		 * URLs which escape their root via "../" can overwrite
		 * the host field and previous components, resolving to
		 * URLs like https::example.com/submodule.git and
		 * https:///example.com/submodule.git that were
		 * susceptible to CVE-2020-11008.
		 */
		if (count_leading_dotdots(url, &next) > 0 &&
		    (*next == ':' || *next == '/'))
			return -1;
	}

	else if (url_to_curl_url(url, &curl_url)) {
		int ret = 0;
		char *normalized = url_normalize(curl_url, NULL);
		if (normalized) {
			char *decoded = url_decode(normalized);
			if (strchr(decoded, '\n'))
				ret = -1;
			free(normalized);
			free(decoded);
		} else {
			ret = -1;
		}

		return ret;
	}

	return 0;
}

static int name_and_item_from_var(const char *var, struct strbuf *name,
				  struct strbuf *item)