Remove the most recently installed hook (LIFO). Only calls ``hook.uninstall()`` if this layer was the one that actually installed it; nested

Update behavioral baseline for an agent

Recompute baseline statistics from the rolling window.

Update the overall chain hash.

Return True when the AGT 5.0 ACS bridge can construct a runtime.

Return whether a configured HTTP header is safe to pass to urllib.

Pre-flight validation for CLI path arguments. Returns ``None`` on success, or a single-line error message that the caller should print to std

Validate against data graph

Return an error message if ``value`` is not a valid ISO date.

Validate a manifest and return list of errors.

Validate request against all applicable policy rules

Return a list of failure messages; empty list means all passed.

Validate against policy graph

Validate a refresh token against issued tokens. Returns: True if the token is valid and bound to the given DID.

Best-effort regex validation addressing the ReDoS concern raised in #908 review. Checks: 1. Pattern compiles cleanly (no syntax errors

Validate if request would succeed in production

Validate the sponsor's Ed25519 signature. The sponsor signs over: agent_name + sponsor_email + capabilities (concatenated wi

Validate target command binary against the allowlist (V11).

Validate against temporal graph

Validate tool definitions against policy allowlist. Args: tools: List of tool definitions from the request. Raises:

Validate tool definitions against policy allowlist. Args: tools: List of tool definitions from the request. Raises:

Validate tool definitions against policy allowlist. Args: tools: Tool definitions from the request. Raises:

Raise if the transition is invalid.

Validate a parsed YAML policy dict and return (errors, warnings). Performs three validation passes in order: 1. JSON Schema validation via ``

Verify the certificate's self-signature and Ed25519 key type. Returns False if the public key is not Ed25519 or if the self-signature

Perform verification using drift-based consensus. Algorithm: 1. Query each model with the claim 2. Calculate

Verify proof-of-possession on a relay ``connect`` frame. Required fields when ``_REQUIRE_DID_POP`` is True: - ``from`` — the agent DID (``di

Verify a Sigstore bundle with cosign. Returns True on success.

Verify an ``Ed25519-Timestamp`` Authorization header. Returns the DID. Format: ``Ed25519-Timestamp <did> <iso8601> <base64(signature)>`` The

Verification method 3: cross-check execution against egress decisions. The Azure egress proxy is a different service from the data-plane ``ex

Verify an Entra object exists via Microsoft Graph API. Args: object_id: The Entra object ID to verify. Returns:

Cross-check the certificate's public key against the registry. Looks up the DID in the identity registry and verifies that the certif

Best-effort signature check for compatibility mode only.

Re-verify an on-disk manifest's signature and artifact hash.

Verify that a stored peer record has not been tampered with. Detects accidental in-process corruption only. An adversary with read+wr

Verification method 1: print values that only the sandbox can produce. Empirically, an Azure Container Apps sandbox container reports::

Verify the peer scope chain and return the effective delegated capabilities.

Verify the Ed25519 cryptographic signature of an attestation. The public key is stored as raw base64 (32 bytes). The signature

Verify the signed pre-key signature against the Ed25519 identity key. Fail-closed: if identity_key_ed is missing or verification fails, raise

Generate human-readable reason for policy denial.

Wait logic for ``IsolationLevel.PROCESS``.

Wait logic for ``IsolationLevel.SUBPROCESS``.

Yield ``(path, parsed_yaml)`` for every ATR rule file.

Walk a directory tree looking for agent artifacts.

Wrap the LangChain client's methods to intercept tool calls.

Wrap ``generate_reply`` with message interception and governance. Unlike ``initiate_chat``, violations in ``generate_reply`` return a

Wrap a message handler with DLQ error handling.

Wrap agent functions that return agents (handoffs).

Wrap ``initiate_chat`` with pre-/post-execution governance. Args: agent: The AutoGen agent to patch. ctx: Execution c

Wrap every node in the StateGraph with governance hooks. Handles both plain callables and ToolNode instances. Adds sentinel to preven

Wrap ``receive`` with inbound message governance. Intercepts messages arriving at this agent and validates them against the active po

Wrap a single tool's function with governance interception.

Replace ``tool.forward`` with a governed version.

Wrap a CrewAI tool's _run method with governance interception.

Intercept all tools registered on the agent.